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ABSTRACT 
HCI research into usability and security over 10 years has 
repeatedly found that users are unable to cope when faced with 
unusable password policies. Yet to show the full impact of these 
policies, it is necessary to consider the context of use within the 
organisation. Password requirements which users cannot meet 
have a cost in terms of impact on users’ primary task and, hence, 
loss of productivity. Conversely, organisational practices 
determine the numbers of passwords and the frequency of use. 
Retrospective accounts, questionnaires, and experimental methods 
fail to capture the full context of use. 
We present our experiences from the use of a study which was 
designed to overcome these shortcomings. We devised a 
structured diary study of password use followed by detailed 
debrief interviews. We found that this study effectively elicited 
participants’ main password uses and brought to light details of 
the context of use. However, the study did not capture accurate 
measures of workload or time taken in password use; these are 
better measured through other methods. Finally, our research 
leads us to conclude that there are further impacts of passwords in 
the workplace which can only be fully understood from richer 
ethnographic methods. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): D.4.6 
Security and protection, K.6.5 Authentication.  
General Terms 
Experimentation, Security, Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Diary studies; passwords; ethnographic studies; semi-structured 
interviews 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Passwords interrupt the smooth flow of work; coping with these 
interruptions calls on other skills and knowledge on the part of 
password users. Indeed, it is partly the intention of passwords to 
act as “barriers” to action [6], and the challenge is to minimise the 
impact of these barriers for legitimate users while maintaining 
them for those who should not have access. 
Our goal is to reduce some of these barriers and to understand the 
true impact – the user cost - of security policies, and how users 
cope with them to complete their primary tasks. 
Users’ ability to develop methods for devising, remembering, and 
using multiple passwords is an unremarked but remarkable skill 
which employees have mainly learned from improvisation, from 
pieces of often conflicting advice, and from talking to colleagues. 
However, these coping methods are symptomatic of failures in 
password policy, rather than a justification for ever more stringent 
password requirements [1, 10]. 
In coming to this understanding, laboratory studies of human 
behaviour in HCI can be criticised for being too distinct from the 
normal context of use. Ethnographic approaches based on 
observation or participation enable the researcher to study and 
document work practices in everyday settings [5]. However, as in 
our case, traditional ethnographic methods such as observation are 
often impractical or too invasive in the workplace, for various 
reasons. 
We present an approach which we took to capture, as far as 
possible, the contextuality of the ethnographic approach within 
the practical limitations of the resources and access to participants 
available to us. 
1.1 The Ethnography of Passwords 
Innovative technologies have signally failed to achieve universal 
usable security and privacy. Passwords remain the most widely-
used form of personal authentication, despite many promising 
alternatives. 
Understanding the reasons for this demands a consideration not 
only of the technologies, but also of the practices into which these 
technologies are incorporated [6]. This all the more so where, as 
in the case of passwords, the technology is simple but remains 
very widespread. 
Even though typing a password is a relatively bounded act, it 
nevertheless exists within a context of social criteria and values 
[5]. Only by understanding these factors can the full impact of 
password use be understood. 
For example, the basis of organisational password policies rests 
on assumptions, often unstated, about the perceived need for a 
given level of security. 
At the same time, for users the focus is not on security but on their 
primary task, which in the workplace means getting their work 
completed, often under time pressure. 
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Table 1: Participants in the diary & interview study 
Organisation A 
A large research-intensive university; participants are 
administrators, and lecturers or researchers in disciplines removed 
from Computer Science and HCI, and teaching staff: 
Administrative staff 9 
Lecturing and research (all apart from 1 are non- 
Computer Science/HCI) 
6 
Organisation B 
A large financial services organisation. Participants are members 
of a security team and Human Resources administrators. The 
security team members are of interest to us as a sample of more 
security-aware users 
HR Administration  5 
Security team 12 
1.2 Reasons for the Study Design 
Sensitivity considerations, especially in financial services meant 
that in our case, video recording was not an option. 
Ethnography would suggest traditional pencil-and-paper 
observation. We believe that this could be very effective; 
however, an initial trial was found to be too intrusive by 
participants. 
We therefore chose a structured diary study as a way to gather “in 
the wild” [6] data, in an objective and generalisable way, but with 
minimal disruption and interruption to participants’ daily work. It 
is important to stress that laboratory, ethnographic, and diary 
studies are not alternatives methodologies but are best used in 
combination, for a rounded view of the questions of interest. 
Diaries rely on user-generated data and therefore depend on the 
reliability of the participants. We considered other forms of 
quantitative data which could in some cases be obtained from 
non-user sources, such as analysis of system logs, or direct 
methods such as client software to record aspects of password use, 
such as was done by Florêncio & Herley [7]. However, we wanted 
to build a full picture of password use in the workplace, and 
neither of these methods was available to us across all 
applications. These less user-dependent forms of data capture 
could nevertheless have been useful to give a measure of the 
accuracy of the diaries. 
The study produced some important substantive findings which 
we have presented in another paper [8]. In this paper, we expand 
on our experiences – with reflective self-criticisms – of the 
approach we took. 
2. DESIGN OF THE DIARY STUDY 
Diary studies have become an accepted research method in HCI, 
using either paper or other methods of recording [3, 9]. In the 
sense that we used the diaries prior to a debrief interview, our 
method is similar to Brown et al. [3]; we used diary capture 
initially, which then supported richer data collection through in-
depth debrief interviews. 
It is important to be clear, however, that in our study the diary was 
highly structured, with only limited free space fields in which 
participants were invited to record free-text descriptions of the 
background task and the specific reason for the password use. By 
choosing a diary study, we were choosing a level of research with 
a far smaller set of participants than large-scale studies such as 
Florêncio & Herley [7]. On the other hand, we were able to asks 
why users use particular passwords; it is far more in-depth and, in 
a positive way, more subjective. 
The process of keeping the password diary does not consist only 
of the period while participants are actually keeping the diary. Our 
data gathering had three parts: 
1. Introducing the requirements of the diary to the participant; 
this is a key element in success 
2. The participant kept the diary for one week, with regular 
contact from the researchers 
3. A final debrief asked structured questions about each of the 
passwords, and allowed for unstructured probing about the 
circumstances of password use and specific incidents 
recorded in the diaries. 
2.1 Two Contrasting Organisations 
Because we were concerned with organisational password 
policies, we recruited participants from among staff members 
within two organisations. Over a period from December, 2008 to 
August, 2009, we recruited 32 participants who each kept the 
diary for 4-5 working days – see Table 1. Participants were all 
volunteers and were compensated with gift certificates.  
2.1.1 Diary-Keeping Only in the Workplace 
We were interested particularly in organisational password 
policies and their impact on primary tasks. It is also important to 
avoid invading the privacy of participants by investigating non-
work related issues. However, there is a large interplay between 
work-oriented and non-work oriented password use. The same 
password may be used for different purposes, or the same service, 
such as airline booking or Webmail, may be used for both 
personal and work-related purposes. 
For this reason, we asked our participants to record every 
password use during their working day, including non-work use, 
for one week. Some participants routinely work from home, or 
outside normal office hours; we asked them to include passwords 
during what they regard as “work” time, regardless of time or 
location. 
2.2 Three forms of “In the Wild” Data 
Our collection methods yielded three distinct forms of data: 
2.2.1 Qualitative data from the diary studies 
Unlike conventional diary studies, our diaries were highly 
structured. Nevertheless we chose to keep the background task 
and the specific reasons for use as free-text fields; the space 
available was a hint to participants that around 2-8 words were 
expected. 
The use made of this field showed, as expected, many 
commonalities, but was also a strong reminder of the wider 
context of password use. For example, “Coming back from lunch” 
or from a meeting; starting work; or logging into a portal. 
The free-text fields showed the impact of different password 
practices in the two organisations: in one, users are required by 
policy to lock desktop PC’s every time they move away from their 
desks, even for a short period, but complete shut-down is 
generally only required at weekends (when upgrades are often run 
by systems staff). In the other organisation, by contrast, there is no 
such rule, but participants habitually close down their desktop PCs 
overnight. On the other hand, in this organisation, staff are mainly 
working on internal online services, which in some cases must be 
accessed via a virtual desktop, so that logging onto the local 
desktop PC is only one part of the initial daily login process. 
2.2.2 Qualitative data from the debrief interviews 
As soon as possible following the completion of one week’s 
diary-keeping, participants were interviewed in depth in a debrief 
interview about their password use. The interviews were highly 
structured around a questionnaire, which ensured that each of the 
passwords was discussed fully, but participants were encouraged 
to expand on their responses. 
The debrief interviews were voice-recorded and fully transcribed 
to capture the richness of the data. We recorded 17.4 hours of 
interviews from these participants. Although this is a relatively 
small sample size, it is appropriate for an in-depth analysis of 
diaries and qualitative data. 
Contrary to our initial expectations, we found that the debrief 
interviews were the most useful source of insights into password 
use. We chose to make the password, rather than events in 
password use, as the unit of study; this allowed us to expand on 
the use of the password as it fits into the wider context, since 
reasons for use were given in the diaries. This was partly for 
practical reasons, since, even with this higher level of focus, 
interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one hour (about 10-15 
minutes for each password) – we restricted ourselves to one hour 
as the maximum for a single interview. 
In this sense, the password diaries themselves were not successful 
as a way to record password interruptions, but were useful as a 
record of which passwords are actually used in working life. 
There are other useful lessons to be learnt for future diary studies, 
which we discuss this in more detail below. 
However, although the debrief interviews were highly structured, 
they yielded rich qualitative data around the open questions. For 
example, by asking participants about the sensitivity, in their 
perception, of the data or services being protected, and scaling this 
on a 5-point Likert scale, we also elicited the reasons why they 
might consider them to be sensitive, and the “bad things” which 
might happen if a password was to be compromised. 
2.2.3 Quantitative Data 
Our diary study provides data which are amenable to quantitative 
analysis, for example around the frequencies of various kinds of 
password events. For two participants, we found that the diary-
keeping was too unreliable and discarded it from the quantitative 
analysis, but retained the qualitative interviews.  
The diaries generated 982 password events involving 196 distinct 
passwords. Some of these distinct passwords are identical to 
others, either by constraint of the system architecture or by users’ 
choices; taking this into account gives 137 unique passwords. 
Both the diaries and the debrief interviews yielded large amounts 
of quantitative data about the nature of the passwords, their 
frequency of use and of changing, classifications about how 
passwords are chosen and reasons for use, and other factors. 
However, it was not possible to make meaningful correlations 
between, for example, strength of the password and sensitivity of 
the data being protected, because of enforced strength rules; 
particularly in Organisation A, passwords are constrained 
according to policy-makers’ views of what makes a good, strong 
password.  
But this rather negative finding is in reality a useful finding in 
itself, since it shows a tension between the enforced password rule 
and the perception of what is necessary, and what is humanly 
possible in terms of memorability: 
... it's got to the point where it's so difficult to remember, so 
difficult to make one up, and difficult to remember, that I 
have to write it down until I've learnt it, but then we're 
asked to change it again, so I have to write the new one 
down cos I can't remember the new one. 
So, I think it gets to a point where they restrict it too much, 
it makes it less secure – Administrator, Organisation A 
2.3 Analysis Using Grounded Theory 
We analysed the transcribed recordings using a variant of 
Grounded Theory [4], using Atlas TI [11] to aid our qualitative 
analysis. Because we were interested in a number of dimensions 
in password use, rather than attempting to find one core category, 
we developed codes around the following categories: 
• Factors impacting on perceptions of sensitivity of the 
protected data or service 
• Estimated strength of the password (we also developed a 
measure of strength from entropy) 
• How participants cope with the demands of policies 
• The “ecology” or context surrounding password use 
We also coded for a similarity between passwords, which had 
emerged as an issue during the interviews; in one organisation, 
many passwords were constrained to be identical by the 
architecture of the authentication system, whereas in the other, 
there was a true single sign-on password for most organisational 
applications. 
From the diary data free-form field, we also had a rich set of 
reasons for password use; a total of 436 different entries, which 
we categorised to reflect commonalities, as we interpreted them. 
A small sample of these uses, and the 15 “generic” reasons by 
which we categorised them, is shown in Table 2. 
3. HOW THE STUDY INFORMED OUR 
RESULTS 
Recall that our main interest is in the impact of password policies 
within organisations; thus, we emphasise the organisational 
context as well as the policies, rather than considering passwords 
in simple generic terms. 
Participants were remarkably open about discussing their 
passwords. It was important that we made clear to them that 
interviews were in confidence, and that any findings will not be 
personally attributable. 
3.1 Findings from the Study 
By way of illustration of the positive results from our 
methodology in throwing light on passwords in use, we discuss 
here some of our key findings. For a fuller presentation of these 
findings, see [8]. 
3.1.1 Wider Use of Passwords 
One clear finding, which is often overlooked in studies which do 
not take the full context of password use into account, is that 
passwords are used for a wide variety of different uses; not simply 
for authenticating to services, but also as for uses such as for 
securing files. These are often ad-hoc and used in situations, such 
as sending files through email, where users are aware of a 
potential risk, but are not aware of more reliable means by they 
might overcome the risk. It is interesting that this use differs from 
that found by Dourish et al [6], who found users obscuring their 
email in other ways, such as by using a vague subject line or using 
institutional means to secure data by legal notices in email 
signatures. 
Other emerging uses of passwords include the increasing use of 
“personal work-related” passwords. By this we mean, applications 
such as the use of social networking for work-related contacts, or 
the use of personal email for work uses. 
3.1.2 The Ecology of Password Use 
Answering the “bigger questions”, such as “why are you using 
this password at all”? requires looking at the password use in 
context, such as preferences for particular email services, the need 
to use specific services to complete a work task, and conflicts 
between users’ needs and password policies. 
For example, in one of the organisations, some of the internal 
services can only be accessed by first logging in to an online 
virtual workstation. This provides a fully-functional working 
environment, which for some users is their main digital working 
space. For such users, this largely overcomes differences between 
working at home or in the office. Indeed, it adds an extra layer of 
security for home working. For others, however, the conventional 
desktop PC remains as the main workspace, and so logging on to 
the virtual workstation is simply an extra step before the required 
service can be accessed. 
Finally, but significantly, we also found that insecure practices, 
such as writing passwords down in plain text in places which 
could be accessed by others, are still prevalent. This is a good 
example of a finding that can only be captured by asking people 
directly. 
4. OVERCOMING METHODOLOGICAL 
ISSUES 
The password diaries were found to be very useful as a way to 
capture all the passwords people actually use (or use within the 
workplace); much more reliable than simply remembering them 
retrospectively. However, to achieve satisfactory data gathering 
while minimising the impact on participants required a number of 
iterations of the diary design. 
4.1 Some Problems with the Structured Diary 
4.1.1 Balancing Richness with Participant 
Compliance 
Conventional diary studies are very time-consuming, not only for 
researchers but also for participants. Since passwords are an  
Table 2: Sample Reasons for Password Use 
Reason for password use Generic reason for use 
About to continue with day's 
work 
Unlocking PC or other 
device 
About to login for the day - 
unlocking PC 
Logging-on to PC and/or 
domain or other device - 
routine 
About to read email email - internal 
Access database - 
compensation details secure 
Local file protection 
Access database - data is 
confidential 
Local file protection 
Access organisational 
calendar - add meetings 
Authentication for online 
service - company internal 
Access to internal DRM Authentication for online 
service - company internal 
Access to policies – policy 
service 
Authentication for online 
service - company internal 
Access website - look at 
financial news 
Authentication for external 
service 
Accessing application Authentication for external 
service 
Accessing application for list 
of work queries 
Authentication for external 
service 
Accessing case management 
application 
Authentication for online 
service - company internal 
interruption in themselves, we regarded it as important to avoid, 
as far as possible, adding extra interruptions to participants’ 
primary tasks. 
To achieve this, we designed several iterations of a structured 
form to minimise interruption and to guide participants to provide 
the data in which we were most interested. We asked participants 
to record each password use against a short nickname for the 
password, which they chose for themselves. Then, in the debrief 
interviews, we categorised each password according to its main 
uses, as reported by the participant. 
One early “tick-sheet” version of the structured diary was 
successful in achieving compliance, but at the cost of almost no 
information about the services being accessed. This was 
particularly problematic where participants recorded the same 
password used for multiple applications as one password (an 
ambiguity which we discuss below). 
On the other hand, the free-form text fields in which participants 
recorded the reason for password use provided much more 
richness, but also raised the problem that participants would 
record the reason at different contextual “levels”; for example, 
“starting work” or “logging onto PC” are both reasons for 
password use, but the larger task provides the context for the more 
specific one. 
To overcome this ambiguity, we included some examples on the 
form, but this raises the new risk of biasing the data towards the 
examples given rather than the participants’ actual experience. 
As a final consideration of the recording method, we also offered 
participants the choice of recording their diary using a voice-
recorder, making very short recordings for each password event. 
This option was chosen by only one participant, however. We 
speculate that, in a noisy office, talking into a voice recorder 
might be considered too intrusive, and that participants might 
prefer not to risk being overheard as they record their password 
diary. 
4.1.2 Reliability of completion 
We suspect there is under-reporting of password problems, 
especially of re-tries where the final result was success; it seems 
that participants are so used to re-typing a password that they 
hardly even register it. 
Accurate recording is especially problematic during busy periods 
– which are particularly interesting occasions for password 
research. Users sometimes think they can fill the diary in later 
from memory; they cannot. It is important to make this clear to 
participants. 
As well as the space for participants to describe in free text what 
they were doing during password use, the diary asked them to 
estimate the disruption, on 5-point Likert scale, and the time taken 
in seconds. However, these measures, while interesting for 
comparison, are very subjective; they do not provide an accurate 
measure of the time actually taken (which would be better 
measured experimentally), and participants often did not perceive 
interruptions, unless there had been some major problem. 
4.1.3 The same passwords used for many services. 
We needed to know which service was being accessed, but we 
also needed to know in which cases the same password was used 
for several services. This should be uncovered in the debrief. We 
found in practical use of the diary that this raised a problem of 
consistency; without guidance, some participants chose to record 
different services with identical passwords as different passwords, 
while others recorded them as the same one. 
Ambiguity is more likely if identical passwords are enforced by 
the architecture (single-sign-on or a single password). It is 
important to make the distinction, because participants’ perceived 
sensitivity of the password may be different for the different 
services being protected. 
4.2 Overcoming Problems in Diary Studies 
We relied on the diaries as a cue to the debriefs. It was all the 
more important, therefore, for them to be completed as accurately 
as possible, and to be available to the interviewer during the 
interview. 
Unless the diaries are available before the debrief is conducted, it 
is easy to miss passwords, especially as there is pressure to 
maximise the use of volunteer participants’ time. For the same 
reason, we chose in general, not, to follow up specific incidents, 
such as a password failure, during the debriefs. 
4.2.1 Prepare Initial Instructions for Participants. 
Wherever possible, instruct participants face to face. Doing this in 
a group is acceptable, as long as there is an opportunity for 
participants to ask questions. Where this is not possible, then 
participants must be followed up early in the diary study. This 
initial instruction is also the opportunity for some informal 
observation of the workplace and the participant’s context of use. 
Visit participants at the end of the first day whenever possible to 
check for any misunderstandings. In addition to this, keep in close 
contact by phone or email. A freeform diary study would involve 
daily debriefs; this is not necessary with a very structured dairy, 
but close contact with participants is nevertheless essential. There 
is only one chance to capture this data, so poorly completed 
diaries are wasted and cannot be re-done. 
4.2.2 Pilot the Diary, as Many Times as Necessary. 
Pilot the diary with a sample of “real” users; check especially for 
ambiguities. In the pilots, we realised the importance of ensuring 
that tick-items have options for “yes” and “no” (or “success” and 
“failed” etc.), rather than simply one tick-box for negative events. 
Otherwise, if a box is unchecked, there is no way to know if this 
means “ok”, or that the participant simply forgot to check it. 
Once the diary is designed, following the pilot studies, resist the 
temptation to “improve” the empirical instrument once the data-
capture has started. As well as potentially reducing rigour, this 
introduces the risk of new problems and ambiguities. An example 
of such ambiguities is the case of a participant who completed the 
field “Why are you using this password?” by responding “because 
it is the correct password” – interpreting the field to mean “Why 
are you using this password (rather than some other password)?”. 
4.2.3 Allow Plenty of Time for the Debrief Interviews 
Debrief time of 10-15 minutes for each password is reduced a 
little where passwords are identical, but even in those cases it is 
still necessary to enquire about services for which each password 
is used, and the level of sensitivity and the circumstances 
surrounding each. 
Rather than regarding this as a problem, this is indicative of the 
very rich findings from even this very structured form of 
interview. Failing to allow enough time to capture this richness 
would limit the valuable opportunity to discuss attitudes and elicit 
narratives around password use. 
4.2.4 Careful Recording of Results 
It is worth giving careful thought to the recording of the results, 
both the structured quantitative data, and the recordings of 
interviews. 
We recorded the diary and the quantitative details of passwords in 
a structured Microsoft Access database, which gave more 
flexibility than a spreadsheet. Although initial set-up of the 
database is more complex, this allows analysis in many different 
ways, and forms can be designed to make data entry very fast. 
To ensure confidentiality - necessary to gain the confidence of 
participants and as basic ethical good practice - there is a need to 
secure the recordings and transcripts from unauthorised reading; 
this can be done simply by storing on an encrypted drive or in 
password protected files. Participants and their associated files are 
anonymised, with identities known only to core researchers. The 
same level of security is necessary when files are in transit; for 
example, an encrypted USB drive should be used. 
5. REFLECTIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS 
AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
5.1 Diary-Keeping as Classification 
In the design of the diary form, we invited participants to record 
events according to pre-defined categories in terms of location 
(home, office, mobile, or other); numbers of attempts; and 
whether the password is written down, or is automatically entered 
by a browser. We pre-defined error types: with passwords and/or 
the user Id, leading to re-tries, total forgetting, or to resets by a 
helpdesk. 
Having allowed a free-text field for participants to describe the 
reasons for password use, we then categorised these reasons into a 
much smaller set of “categories” of use, for various quantitative 
analyses. 
In these ways, we implicitly assumed that all passwords and 
events around passwords could be uniquely and unambiguously 
identified. Yet were aware that in doing this we were pre-making 
classifications into which local, circumstantial, unpredictable real-
world events were to be made to fit.. 
This well-studied issue in society and technology stems from the 
seminal work of Bowker and Starr [2]. Categorisations are the 
basis for analysis in research, for making sense of the world, but 
are also inevitably reductionist and hide implicit assumptions. 
Used carelessly, categorisations valorise some viewpoints while 
silencing others; in our research towards usable security, we must 
seek to ensure that the viewpoints we strengthen are those of the 
users, rather than our own or which are inherent in the design of 
the technology. 
5.2 Insights to improve future studies 
Although we have made some interesting and innovative findings 
from our study, we are aware that our study was made under some 
practical constraints. 
To the extent that we were able to overcome these practical 
difficulties, we offer this paper as a methodological contribution 
showing novel techniques in collection and analysis of a broad 
qualitative and quantitative dataset. 
On the other hand, to the extent that we wish to avoid 
reductionism, we believe that there is much work still to be done 
to address the full impact of unusable password policies. We 
suggest that this should take the form of deeper ethnographic 
studies. 
Referring again to an earlier study which provides inspiration for 
our own, Brown et al. [3] have shown a way to combine diaries 
with photographic recording. Now that video recording is 
increasingly easy and affordable, this provides an exciting 
possibilities for further research. Suchman [12] showed the 
potential of detailed analysis of video recordings in a controlled 
setting, but this is now a realistic possibility for understanding 
routine action which is not only situated, but is recorded in the 
context of use. 
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